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THE ORIGINAL SIN: "TERRORISM" OR "CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY"?
Chibli Mallat*
Once the Middle East connection was established over the September
11 attacks, apprehension and uneasiness gripped the region. Eyebrows are
now raised over the word "terrorism," and there is hardly a newspaper in
the Arab and Muslim world that does not question everyday the "definition
of the word," amidst large-scale suspicion of its use for a new form of
Western domination over the east.
Within the Arab world, "terrorism" is a word negatively associated
with the more extreme characters in Israeli governments, from Benjamin
Netanyahu, sometime founder of an international "anti-terrorism center" in
the 1970s, to Ariel Sharon, who regularly depicts Yasser Arafat as a
"murderous terrorist," whom he will have nothing to do with. Arab
uneasiness is shared by governments and peoples, who hear the current
Prime Minister of Israel rave on the one hand about the self-righteousness
of "targeted killings" and the uprooting of Palestinian dwellers in "Zionist
land," while on the other hand describe any violence by Palestinians as
pure, unadulterated "terrorism." In addition, terrorism triggers conflicting
responses for much of the populations in the region, who see how their
governments flag it systematically and indiscriminately to repress their own
opposition movements, at a time no Arab government can claim to be
genuinely democratic (with the possible exception of Morocco).
The word becomes therefore a fig leaf for selective repression at
various levels, none of which garners any sympathy from the person on the
street. Mutatis mutandis, this is also true in other parts of the world,
including the West. The term "terrorism" was first associated with 19th
century anarchist attacks against Russian czars, or even earlier,
Robespierre's terror. No definition of terrorism since then has been very
useful. The difficulty of defining "terrorism" with any accuracy, in law or
in politics, appears even more acute towards the Middle East since
September 11.
The contradictions any definition of "terrorism" is bound to carry has
not escaped American policy-makers. Several months after the September
11 massacres, countries traditionally depicted in Washington as "rogue" or
"terrorist" countries, such as Sudan, Libya and Yemen, are being cultivated
and praised for their "collaboration over the fight against terrorism" since
September 11.
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This contradiction has not prevented all international resolutions since
then from adopting "terrorism" as the keyword, the original sin from which
all evil arguably derives. On September 12, U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1308 characterized the events of the previous day as "terrorist
attacks." That same day The General Assembly adopted a unanimous
resolution condemning "heinous acts of terrorism" and called "for
international cooperation to prevent and eradicate acts of terrorism." SCR
1373, adopted on September 28, has put in place a Committee devoted to
preventing and punishing "terrorism."
At the same time, a few domestic and international voices remind us
of the word's uncertainties, particularly the voices of Mary Robinson, the
UN Human Rights Commissioner and of Antonio Cassese, a highly
respected authority in international law who served on the International
Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia. In its extraordinary meeting on
September 20, the European Council acknowledged the problem in noting
"the urgent need for a common understanding, not only politically but also
legally, of what terrorism means." This is an acknowledgment that there is
no common European understanding of the term, and it stems from the long
European experience in fighting "terror." With all the anti-terrorist laws
adopted, some form of accommodation with "terrorist" organizations, like
the IRA or the Basque or Corsican nationalists, has invariably followed.
The same uncertainties can be found, on a different mode, in American law.
The joint resolution in Congress, adopted on September 14, authorized the
president to use military force against "those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on Sept. 11, 2001." But terrorism is ill-defined in
federal statutes, practically all of which are linked to plane hijacking or the
criminal use of poisonous substances (and which are inspired by some nine
international conventions on terrorism ratified by Washington). Normally,
criminal law should be perfectly capable of dealing with these acts.
However, the violence, wantonness and scale of the September 11 attacks
put them at a different level than repetitive killings, or serial murders
carried out by one person or group.
This explains the problem, in Europe, America, and the Arab or
Muslim world: what happened on September 11 is not simply a plane
hijacking turned tragic. Nor is it a replica of the 1985 killing of a
handicapped civilian in a hijacked cruise-liner, nor the painful death of a
child, in front of the world cameras, at the beginning of the Intifada. Nor
even of the many cases of bombs planted in thoroughfares or
indiscriminately lobbed at civilian areas by fighter jets.
September 11 is different because of its context and its magnitude. By
its sheer size, its wantonness, its ferocity, its callousness, its suddenness, the
means used, the thousands of innocent civilians destroyed in minutes,
September 11 qualifies as a crime against humanity, a category which,
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unlike "terrorism," is well defined in international law and carries the
common responsibility of humankind.
Article7 of the International Criminal Court Statutes of 1998, for
example, clearly describes a crime against humanity as an act "committed
as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population." There is a profound pedigree to this concept, which can be
found in the very early principles of "the law of people:" the great
European publicist Vattel wrote in 1758 that even if justice is normally
limited territorially to the state in which a crime is committed, "one must
except from the rule those thugs who, because of the magnitude of their
crimes... declare themselves the enemy of human kind."
This international principle-which was also adopted in Nuremberg-
opens a number of legal avenues which the nebulous concept of terror is
unable to address in the present state of international law. The crime against
humanity category offers a far more precise description of what happened
on September 11. The Belgian law of June 16, 1993 (modified on February
10, 1999), under which a case was recently lodged against the current Prime
Minister of Israel for his responsibility in the 1982 massacres of Sabra and
Chatila offers a good example of such precise language: not only does it
condemn massive killings and other crimes as crimes against humanity, but
it also calls for the prosecution of "those who design, hold or carry an
instrument.. .or transform an existing instrument or construction... for the
purpose of carrying such crimes." The details of the use of aircraft as mass
murder instrument on September 11 could hardly be better qualified.
The consequences of the definition are important. When the acts of
September 11 are defined as a crime against humanity, rather than as
terrorism, the response under international law must involve the whole of
mankind. Every single person in the world is concerned, and every
government is bound to cooperate to produce the suspects and culprits and
assist in the investigation. This is not the case for acts of terrorism. States
do not have a clear responsibility under international law to respond
actively to terrorism, and the next bomb in Kashmir will not see the
mobilization of the whole world to attack the perpetrators or the states that
harbor them-and this not only because it has not happened on U.S. soil.
There is in crime an economy of scale which has been accurately described
in such classic cases as the 1961 Eichmann case in Israel, or the Rwanda
and Yugoslavia ongoing cases. As graphically expressed by a French
author, it is inconceivable "to allow the Holocaust getting divided, and
losing its nature (ddnaturer), into six million times one murder."
Unlike terrorism, the mechanism for crimes against humanity carries
serious precedents which can be invoked unanimously, and are clear. They
stress process, both short-term and long-term measures, systematic and
worldwide investigation, accountability and responsibility, the need to
pursue actively the perpetrators and accomplices, and the rejection of
"sovereign" obstacles in both investigation and trial.
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If the September 11 attacks were defined as a crime against humanity,
rather than as terrorism, many would find it easier to follow the American
lead in the search for the perpetrators of the massacres, rather than the
open-ended and ill-defined crusade against an indeterminate foe. By
changing its definition, the originally named (and in our view properly so)
"infinite justice" operation would take its rightful place in the history of
mass crime, and join the search for justice elsewhere in the world, such as
in the killing fields of Cambodia, the Sierra Leone brutalities, and the Sabra
and Chatila massacres.
